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Abstract
We use a Markov regime-switching heteroskedasticity model in or-
der to examine the association between inﬂation and inﬂation uncer-
tainty in four European countries over the last forty years. This
approach allows for regime shifts in both the mean and variance of
inﬂation in order to assess the association between inﬂation and its
uncertainty in short and long horizons. We ﬁnd that this association
diﬀers (i) between transitory and permanent shocks to inﬂation and (ii)
across countries. In particular, the association is positive or zero for
transitory shocks and negative or zero for permanent shocks. Hence,
Friedman’s belief that inﬂation is positively associated with inﬂation
uncertainty is only partially supported in this study, i.e., by short-run
inﬂation uncertainty.
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The issue of the welfare costs of inﬂation has drawn the attention of
macroeconomists for many years both at the theoretical and empirical level.
In fact, the recent emphasis on price stability, expressed for practical pur-
poses as low and stable inﬂation, among the world’s major Central Banks, in-
cluding the Federal Reserve System and the European Central Bank (ECB),
is predicated on the assumed adverse impact of inﬂation on economic eﬃ-
ciency. Lucas (2000) estimates the welfare gain of reducing inﬂation from
14% to 3% at about 0.8% of US real GDP irrespective of the explicit form as-
sumed by the money demand function1. It is widely accepted that the focus
of monetary policy on price stability is the main cause of the low inﬂation
rates achieved by several industrialized countries (Greenspan, 2004).
Considerable ambiguity surrounds the impact of the average rate of in-
ﬂation on the rate of economic growth at the theoretical level. Furthermore,
the impact of inﬂation on output growth may take place indirectly, via the
inﬂation uncertainty channel. Friedman (1977) in his Nobel lecture ar-
gues that a rise in the average rate of inﬂation leads to more uncertainty
about the future rate of inﬂation, it distorts the eﬀectiveness of the price
mechanism in allocating resources eﬃciently, and thus it creates economic
ineﬃciency and a lower level of output. Moreover, inﬂation uncertainty by
aﬀecting interest rates also impacts on the intertemporal allocation of re-
sources. Hence, a comprehensive empirical study that tests for the real
eﬀects of inﬂation should control for the impact of inﬂation uncertainty on
output. The positive correlation between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty
reported in empirical studies can also arise from a positive causal eﬀect of
inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) provide a
theoretical model that explains such a causal eﬀect. In the presence of more
inﬂation uncertainty, less conservative central bankers have an incentive to
surprise the public and generate unanticipated inﬂation, hoping for output
gains.
The empirical assessment of the relationship between inﬂation uncer-
tainty and inﬂation may be based on various approaches. Early studies
focus on the variability (as opposed to uncertainty) of inﬂation and test for
the correlation between inﬂation and inﬂation variability. The consensus
reached by these studies is that inﬂation variability is positively correlated
with inﬂation. Following Engle’s (1982) pathbreaking paper on Autoregres-
sive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models, researchers measured
uncertainty by the conditional variance of unanticipated shocks to inﬂation.
1Most estimates of the cost of inﬂation are less that 1% of output suggesting that the
costs of inﬂation are very low. An exception is Bullard and Russell (2004) who ﬁnd that
the annual cost of a 10% inﬂation rate is 11.2% of output.
1This allowed for a time-varying measure of inﬂation uncertainty. Engle
(1983) ﬁnds that a rise in inﬂation in the current quarter does not lead to
an increase in uncertainty in the next quarter. Subsequent studies sum-
marised by Holland (1993) and Davis and Kanago (2000) ﬁnd mixed evi-
dence regarding the association between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty
using a variety of methodologies. More recently, Grier and Perry (1998)
using the Generalised ARCH (GARCH) approach test for the bidirectional
causality between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty in the G7. The authors
ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, inﬂation aﬀects positively inﬂation uncertainty in all coun-
tries and, second, mixed evidence across countries regarding the eﬀect of
inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation. However, Fountas and Karanasos (2007)
ﬁnd mixed evidence regarding the causal relationship between inﬂation and
inﬂation uncertainty.
The above mentioned approaches regarding the association between in-
ﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty usually examine this association at either
short run or long-run horizons. For instance, the pre-GARCH studies test
for the eﬀects of inﬂation on its variability over several years whereas many
GARCH studies test for the short-run (or next-quarter) eﬀect. Ball and
Cecchetti (1990) argue that the association between inﬂation and its uncer-
tainty may diﬀer between short-run and long-run horizons. Some simple
correlation analysis between the mean and variance of US inﬂation in the
1954-89 period reported by the authors indicates that these correlations be-
come larger as the horizon considered increases. These results are conﬁrmed
by a more formal approach that distinguishes between permanent and tem-
porary shocks to inﬂation. Motivated by the Ball and Cecchetti (1990)
approach, Kim (1993) proposes a model of Markov-switching heteroskedas-
ticity which is deemed superior to the GARCH approach for three reasons.
First, this approach allows for the possibility of regime shifts. Second, the
Markov regime-switching approach permits the consideration of temporary
and permanent shocks to inﬂation, thus allowing the examination of the
eﬀects of inﬂation on short run and long-run uncertainty about inﬂation.
Third, in contrast to the GARCH approach, it allows for a nonconstant
unconditional variance.
In this paper, the relationship between inﬂation uncertainty and inﬂa-
tion is analysed empirically with the use of a model that allows for Markov
regime-switching heteroskedasticity for four European countries. Our cho-
sen econometric model is similar to the one employed by Kim (1993) and
is applied to quarterly inﬂation data from the last forty years. Our results
are likely to shed some light on the empirical relationship between inﬂa-
tion and inﬂation uncertainty. In particular, they will indicate whether
inﬂation uncertainty is associated with inﬂation as predicted by Friedman
(1977). This is a necessary requirement for the welfare costs of inﬂation
that work via the inﬂation uncertainty channel. Moreover, the results will
2show whether there is evidence that higher inﬂation is associated with more
uncertainty about long-run inﬂation or short-run inﬂation or both. Finally,
our methodological approach will indicate whether short-run and long-run
inﬂation uncertainty aﬀects positively or negatively the rate of inﬂation as
predicted by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Holland (1995), respec-
tively.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical ba-
sis for the relationship between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. Section
3 summarises the empirical literature to date on the association between
inﬂation and uncertainty about the rate of inﬂation. Section 4 presents
our econometric model and section 5 reports and discusses our results. Fi-
nally, Section 6 summarises our main conclusions and draws some policy
implications.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 The impact of inﬂation on inﬂation uncertainty
Economists have appealed to the uncertainty about the future rate of
inﬂation in order to account for the welfare loss that monetary economics
has associated with inﬂation. Predictable inﬂation should not lead to wel-
fare loss since indexation will allow agents to minimize the costs of inﬂation.
However, uncertainty about future inﬂation distorts the eﬃcient allocation
of resources that is based on the price mechanism. Friedman (1977) presents
an informal argument regarding the real eﬀects of inﬂation. Friedman’s ar-
gument represents one of the few existing arguments on the rationalisation
of the welfare eﬀects of inﬂation. His point comes in two parts. In the ﬁrst
leg of the Friedman hypothesis, an increase in inﬂation may induce an er-
ratic policy response by the monetary authority and therefore lead to more
uncertainty about the future rate of inﬂation. As Friedman (1977, p. 466)
wrote: “A burst of inﬂation produces strong pressure to counter it. Policy
goes from one direction to another, encouraging wide variation in the actual
and anticipated rate of inﬂation... Everyone recognises that there is great
uncertainty about what actual inﬂation will turn out to be over any speciﬁc
future interval.” The second part of Friedman’s hypothesis predicts that
increased inﬂation uncertainty would increase the observed rates of unantic-
ipated inﬂation and hence will be associated with the costs of unanticipated
inﬂation. Such costs arise from the eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty on both
the intertemporal and intratemporal allocation of resources. Combining the
link of inﬂation to inﬂation uncertainty and the link of inﬂation uncertainty
to output, we obtain the testable hypothesis that higher inﬂation leads to
3lower output, i.e., a positively-sloped Phillips curve2.
Friedman’s intuitive result has also been subsequently derived formally
by Ball (1992) in an asymmetric information game where the public faces
uncertainty about the type of the policymaker (monetary authority). The
two types of policymaker diﬀer in terms of their willingness to bear the
economic costs of reducing inﬂation. In periods of low inﬂation, the tough
type will apply contractionary monetary policy. Ball assumes that the two
types of policymakers alternate in oﬃce in a stochastic manner. Therefore,
a higher current inﬂation rate creates more uncertainty about the level of
future inﬂation since it is not known whether the tough type will gain power
and ﬁght inﬂation.
2.2 The impact of inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation
The opposite direction of causality to that examined by Friedman in
the inﬂation/inﬂation uncertainty relationship has also been addressed by
the theoretical literature. This literature examines the impact of a change
in inﬂation uncertainty on the average rate of inﬂation. Cukierman and
Meltzer (1986) employ a Barro-Gordon model, where agents face uncertainty
about the rate of monetary growth and therefore, inﬂation. In the presence
of this uncertainty, the policymaker applies an expansionary monetary policy
in order to surprise the agents and enjoy output gains. This argument
implies a positive causal eﬀect from inﬂation uncertainty to inﬂation and has
been dubbed by Grier and Perry (1998) the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis.
Holland (1995) has supplied a diﬀerent argument based on the stabilisation
motive of the monetary authority, the so-called “stabilising Fed hypothesis”.
He claims that, as inﬂation uncertainty rises due to increasing inﬂation,
the monetary authority responds by contracting money supply growth, in
order to eliminate inﬂation uncertainty and the associated negative welfare
eﬀects. Hence, Holland’s argument supports the opposite sign in the causal
relationship, i.e., a negative causal eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation.
The theoretical ambiguity surrounding this causal relationship necessitates
an empirical investigation of the sign of the eﬀect.
2The eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty on output has been addressed formally by Dotsey
and Sarte (2000). In a cash-in-advance model that allows for precautionary savings and
risk aversion, they show that more inﬂation uncertainty can have a positive output growth
eﬀect. According to the authors’ argument, an increase in the variability of monetary
growth, and therefore inﬂation, makes the return to money balances more uncertain and
leads to a fall in the demand for real money balances and consumption. Hence, agents
increase precautionary savings, and the pool of funds available to ﬁnance investment
increases. This result is analogous to the literature’s ﬁnding that ﬁscal policy uncertainty
is conducive to growth by encouraging precautionary savings.
43 The empirical evidence
Early empirical studies on the relationship between inﬂation and its un-
certainty used the variance (or standard deviation) as a measure of uncer-
tainty and hence measured inﬂation variability as opposed to uncertainty.
The use of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and
generalised ARCH (GARCH) approaches introduced by Engle (1982) and
Bollerslev (1986), respectively, allows us to proxy uncertainty using the con-
ditional variance of unpredictable shocks to the inﬂation rate. Engle (1983)
and Bollerslev (1986), making use of the ARCH techniques, do not perform
a statistical test of the Friedman-Ball hypothesis but only compare the es-
timated conditional variance series with the US average inﬂation rate over
various time periods. Engle (1983) in an application of the ARCH approach
ﬁnds that US inﬂation is not related to inﬂation uncertainty, a result being
inconsistent with the Friedman-Ball hypothesis3. Grier and Perry (1998)
use the estimated conditional variance from a GARCH model and employ
Granger-causality tests to test for the direction of causality between aver-
age inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. Baillie et al. (1996) perform these
tests simultaneously in a single model by including lagged inﬂation in the
conditional variance equation and the conditional standard deviation in the
inﬂation equation. In particular, using G7 data, Grier and Perry (1998) ﬁnd
that inﬂation has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on inﬂation uncertainty
in all countries4. On the other hand, Baillie et al. (1996) ﬁnd no signiﬁ-
cant relationship between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. More recently,
Karanasos et al. (2004) using a GARCH-in-Mean (GARCH-M) model en-
riched with lagged inﬂation in the conditional variance equation ﬁnd that
US inﬂation aﬀects positively inﬂation uncertainty, a result supporting the
Friedman-Ball hypothesis. A similar model applied by Fountas (2001) using
historical UK data shows support for the Friedman-Ball hypothesis.
3The evidence on the impact of inﬂation uncertainty on growth is more limited and
is summarised in Holland (1993). GARCH studies of this issue that represent a more
accurate test of the hypothesis that inﬂation uncertainty has negative welfare eﬀects are
mostly based on US data (e.g., Coulson and Robins, 1985; Jansen, 1989; Grier and Perry,
2000, Grier et al., 2004). Exceptions are the studies of Fountas and Karanasos (2006),
Fountas et al. (2006) and Fountas et al. (2004a). The ﬁrst two studies use data on the
G7 and the last one uses data on six European countries. The evidence is rather mixed.
Grier and Perry (2000) and Grier et al. (2004) ﬁnd evidence for a negative eﬀect. In
contrast, Coulson and Robins (1985) and Jansen (1989) ﬁnd evidence for a positive and
zero eﬀect, respectively. Fountas et al (2004a) and Fountas and Karanasos (2006) ﬁnd
mixed evidence using a two-step approach that combines the estimation of a GARCH
model with the implementation of Granger-causality tests.
4Using a Component GARCH-M model of inﬂation that includes lagged inﬂation in
the conditional variance, Grier and Perry (1998) estimate simultaneously the relationship
between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty. They ﬁnd that inﬂation has a positive eﬀect
on inﬂation uncertainty (the Friedman-Ball hypothesis), but uncertainty has no signiﬁcant
impact on inﬂation.
5The causal impact of inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation is tested empiri-
cally using the GARCH approach in Baillie et al. (1996), Grier and Perry
(1998, 2000), Grier et al. (2004) and Fountas et al. (2004). Grier and
Perry (2000) and Grier et al. (2004) use only US data, whereas the rest
of the studies use international data. In general, the evidence is mixed.
Baillie et al. (1996) ﬁnd evidence supporting the link between the two vari-
ables for the UK and some high-inﬂation countries, whereas Grier and Perry
(1998) in their G7 study ﬁnd evidence in favour of the Cukierman-Meltzer
hypothesis for some countries and in favour of the Holland hypothesis for
other countries. Fountas et al. (2004) also obtain mixed evidence. Finally,
Grier and Perry (2000) and Grier et al. (2004) ﬁnd evidence for a zero and
negative eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty on inﬂation in the US, respectively.
GARCH models suﬀer from a potential disadvantage: they cannot ac-
count for regime shifts that may aﬀect both the mean and the variance of
inﬂation. Bhar and Hamori (2004) applying the Kim (1993) model for the
G7 for the 1961-1999 period ﬁnd that inﬂation is positively related with
long-run uncertainty in some countries and positively or negatively related
with short-run uncertainty (depending on the country considered).
4 Econometric Methodology
We adopt the Kim (1993) approach where two diﬀerent volatility regimes,
conditional and unconditional, are determined by two diﬀerent Markov-
switching processes. The following decomposes inﬂation into its two com-
ponents:
¼t = Tt + ¹2S1;t + ¹3S2;t + ¹4S1;tS2;t + (h0 + h1S2;t)et (1)
Tt = Tt¡1 + (Q0 + Q1S1;t)vt (2)
In the two equations above both vt and et are N(0,1). The empirical
model in equations (1) and (2) was ﬁrst discussed by Ball and Cecchetti
(1990). It decomposes inﬂation into two components, a stochastic com-
ponent and a stationary component with shocks to these two components
represented by vt and et; respectively. For example, trend inﬂation is deter-
mined by trend money growth and examples of shocks may include a rise in
trend inﬂation to take account of supply side shocks. The eﬀect of shocks
to the stochastic trend feed through to inﬂation via equation (2) above.
Transitory shocks (et) are also represented and take account of any shock
that leads to a deviation of inﬂation from its trend. These may be demand
(e.g. monetary policy) shocks or supply shocks. In equations (1) and (2),
6S1;t and S2;t are unobserved state variables that determine the regime for
the trend and temporary component, respectively. It is assumed that S1;t
and S2;t evolve independently of each other. A two-state Markov switching
process is adopted with values of 0 taking account of the low variance state
and 1 the high variance state. The two-state Markov process takes on the
following transition probabilities:
Pr[S1;t = 0 j S1;t¡1 = 0] = p00;Pr[S1;t = 1 j S1;t¡1 = 1] = p11;
Pr[S2;t = 0 j S2;t¡1 = 0] = q00;Pr[S2;t = 1 j S2;t¡1 = 1] = q11 (3)
where regime 1 is a low Qt and low ht, (S1;t = 0;S2;t = 0), regime 2
is a low Qt and high ht, (S1;t = 0;S2;t = 1), regime 3 is a high Qt and
low ht, (S1;t = 1;S2;t = 0) and ﬁnally regime 4 is a high Qt and high ht,
(S1;t = 1;S2;t = 1). For example, in equation 3, p00 is the probability that
the trend component will remain in regime 1. The eﬀect of the uncertainty
on inﬂation is represented by ¹2, ¹3 and ¹4. ¹2 indicates the eﬀect of
uncertainty associated with the high inﬂation state for the permanent (long-
run) component, while ¹3 indicates the eﬀect of uncertainty associated with
the high inﬂation state for the temporary (short-run) component. It may
be the case that the eﬀect on inﬂation may be non-linear, as a result we also
include the interaction between the two, ¹4. This term captures the eﬀect of
a change in both short run and long-run uncertainty on inﬂation. Finally,
Q1 (Q0) represents the increase in the variance of the trend component
during the high (low) variance state and h1 (h0) represents the increase in
the variance of the temporary component during the high (low) variance
state.
75 Data and results
5.1 Data
We use quarterly data on the GDP deﬂator as a proxy for the price level
(the only exception being Italy where in the absence of a long time series
CPI is used instead). The data refer to four European countries, namely,
Germany, Italy, Holland and the UK. The sample starts in 1966 (except
for Holland and Italy where it starts in 1977 and 1960, respectively) and
ends in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005. All data are taken from the International
Financial Statistics published by the IMF. We measure inﬂation by the
quarterly diﬀerence of the logarithm of the GDP deﬂator [¼t =log( PIt
PIt¡1)].
We ﬁrst test for the stationarity properties of our data using the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The results of these
tests (not reported) indicate that we can treat the inﬂation rate in each
country as a nonstationary process5.
5.2 Results
Table 1 reports estimates of the Markov regime-switching model of inﬂa-
tion. In particular, we include estimates of the transition probabilities, the
Qs, the hs and the ¹s. With very few exceptions, all estimated probabilities
are close to one and statistically signiﬁcant, a ﬁnding consistent with regime
switching. In two of the four countries (Italy and UK), ¹2 is negative and
signiﬁcant at 5% implying that an increase in long-run uncertainty leads to
lower inﬂation. This supports the theoretical argument of Holland (1995).
In contrast, in two of the four countries (Holland and UK), ¹3 is positive
and signiﬁcant at 5% implying that an increase in short-run uncertainty
raises average inﬂation, thus supporting the Cukierman-Meltzer hypothesis.
In half of the countries examined, both short run and long-run uncertainty
regarding inﬂation have no impact on inﬂation. Finally, the parameter
¹4 is positive and signiﬁcant in three of the four cases considered implying
that an increase in both long run and short-run uncertainty raises average
inﬂation.
Figures 1-8 plot the inﬂation rate and the probability of being in the
high-variance state for the permanent and transitory (temporary) shocks in
the four countries. Inﬂation (the probability of the high-variance state) is
measured along the left-hand (right-hand) side vertical axis. A close look
at the ﬁgures represeinting inﬂation an dthe probability of a high-variance
state for permanent shocks leads to the following observations:
5Results are available from the authors upon request.
8(1) The probability of a high-variance state varies widely across coun-
tries. However, in some countries (Uk and Italy) it is observed that these
probabilities are quite high (close to one) during thetimes of the oil price
shocks, 1973-74 and 1979. In addition, for Italy the probability is close to
zero in 1979, the year the country joined the European Monetary System.
(2) There is evidence for structural change in several countries. For
example, in the UK the probability of high-income state is close to one in
the second half of the 1970s. Similarly, this probability is very high for Italy
in 1973-79 and in 1962 and in Holland for several years in the early 1990s.
In contrast, for Germany the probability is never lower than 0.5, most likely
indicating the absence of regime changes. This evidence supports the choice
of the methodology of Markov regime-switching heteroskedasticity.
(3) In Italy and the UK there seems to exist a negative association be-
tween inﬂation and the probability of a high-variance state for permament
shcoks. In other words, inﬂation and long run inﬂation uncertainty are
negatively related. This is in agreement with the negaive sign of ¹2. This
ﬁnding constradicts the Friedman-Ball hypothesis.
A close look at the ﬁgures that plot the rate of inﬂation and the proba-
bility of a high-variance state for the transitory shocks reveals the following:
(1) The probability of a high variance state for transitory shocks varies
signiﬁcantly across countries. This probability is quite large (close to 1)
for the UK in 1974, for Germany in the early 1970s and early 1990s (the
post-reuniﬁcation years). In contrast, the probability is close to zero for
Italy in 1979, the year it joined the EMS.
(2) There is evidence for structural change in several countries. For
example, in Germany the probability is close to 1 for several quarters in the
early 1970s, for Italy the probability is close to zero in 1979, and for Holland
the probability is close to zero in 1998 and quite small in the following
quarters.
(3) A positive association between inﬂation and the probability of the
high-variance state for transitory shocks is evident for Holland and the UK.
This is consistent with the positive sign of ¹3: Equivalently, inﬂation and
uncertainty about short-run inﬂation are positively related. This evidence
is consistent with the Friedman-Ball hypothesis. As inﬂation rises above
normal, the public is facing more uncertainty regarding the response of the
monetary authority which may be accommodating or disinﬂating.
6 Conclusions
We use a Markov regime-switching heteroskedasticity model in order
to examine the association between inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty in
9four European countries over the last forty years. This approach allows for
regime shifts in both the mean and variance of inﬂation in order to assess the
association between inﬂation and its uncertainty in short and long horizons.
We ﬁnd that this association diﬀers (i) between transitory and permanent
shocks to inﬂation and (ii) across countries. In particular, the association
is positive or zero for transitory shocks and negative or zero for permanent
shocks. Hence, Friedman’s belief that inﬂation is positively associated with
inﬂation uncertainty is only partially supported in this study, i.e., by short-
run inﬂation uncertainty. The evidence for regime shifts highlights the
advantage of the present approach relative to the GARCH methodology
where such regime changes are unaccounted for.
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13Table 1: Markov Switching Model of Inﬂation .
Germany Holland Italy UK
(1966.I-2005.I) (1977.I-2005.I) (1966.I-2005.I) (1966.I-2005.I)
Q0 0.001 0.0001 0.1245* 0.0599
(0.0777) (0.0225) (0.0374) (0.0532)
Q1 0.0600 0.0001 1.2329* 0.0001
(0.0825) (0.0014) (0.2247) (0.0001)
h0 0.3729* 0.4442* 0.0001 1.5367
(0.0363) (0.0545) (0.0015) (0.0975)
h1 0.7491* 1.2693* 0.4546* 0.3415
(0.1322) (0.4159) (0.0369) (0.5634)
¹2 0.4171 0.2217 -2.3195* -0.1350*
(0.5647) (0.4566) (0.5397) (0.0002)
¹3 -0.2157 0.5896* 0.1266 1.9422*
(0.3646) (0.1802) (0.2540) (0.5722)
¹4 0.0812 3.6081* 1.2855* 3.4291*
(0.8829) (1.2543) (0.4257) (0.0003)
p00 0.9805* 0.8635* 0.8821* 0.9726*
(0.0711) (0.1343) (0.0633) (0.0306)
p11 0.9550* 0.9758* 0.9745* 0.9910*
(0.1038) (0.0217) (0.0162) (0.0082)
q00 0.9365* 0.3270 0.9930* 0.4303
(0.0445) (0.2207) (0.0068) (0.3852)
q11 0.9769* 0.9132* 0.9445* 0.9665*
(0.0173) (0.0533) (0.0599)) (0.0431)
Full details on each of the parameters are discussed in the methodology
section in the text. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance at the
5% level is indicated by a *.
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